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What Do Unions Do to Innovation? 
An Empirical Examination of the 
Canadian Private Sector
Scott Walsworth
Using longitudinal data from the Canadian Workplace and employee survey, this 
article estimates the union effect on a firm’s ability to innovate new products. 
The results do not find a negative relationship between unions and product 
innovation. surprisingly the presence of a union is found to have a small positive 
effect on a firm’s ability to innovate new products. These results do not imply 
that unions are important determinants of product innovation; instead they are 
noteworthy because a negative effect is not observed. These findings contradict 
the popular assertion that unions generally detract from firm performance. 
The article then reviews the Canadian and U.s. empirical literature on the 
union effect on various measures of firm performance, such as labour costs, 
employment growth, sales and profitability. in keeping with the results of this 
paper it appears that the argument that unions detract from firm performance is 
not based on a conclusive body of empirical evidence.
KeYWorDs: trade unions, product innovation, Canadian national data
“Innovation is critical for firm success.” This message has been championed by a 
number of sources concerned with business. Recently the management literature 
has included a number of studies that describe the importance of innovation for 
a firm’s success, and even for its survival (for example see De Clercq, Menguc and 
Auh, 2009; Poskela and Martinsuo, 2009). The message is echoed by some of the 
most recognized business leaders. For example Jack Welch, CEO of General Electric 
remarked that “[a]n organization’s ability to learn, and translate that learning into 
action rapidly, is the ultimate competitive business advantage” and Lew Platt, CEO of 
Hewlett-Packard similarly noted that “[s]uccessful companies of the 21st century will 
be those who do the best jobs at capturing, storing and leveraging what their em-
ployees know” (Busi, 2005). The management consulting industry has also noticed 
the interest in innovation and developed a sophisticated array of competencies aimed 
at promoting innovative capabilities among their clients. For example, Outlook, the 
on-line journal for Accenture Consulting is dominated by articles and studies on in-
novation initiatives (Accenture, 2010). If innovation truly is a fundamental component 
of firm success, then it is important to understand what prevents one firm from in-
novating while another has success in this endeavour. 
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According to Statistics Canada approximately one in three workers in Canada 
belongs to a trade union. This, coupled with the spill-over effect unions have 
on non-unionized workplaces, makes unions an important part of the Canadian 
economy. Unions provide a number of services to workers. They give workers a 
collective voice and otherwise provide representation, negotiate higher wages 
and improved benefits, while also providing access to, and support during a third 
party grievance process in the event of a dispute with management. They can 
also be effective in promoting worker interests to local, provincial, and federal 
legislatures. 
While unions can provide many benefits to Canadian workers and the communities 
in which they live, it is often argued that this comes with a cost. The argument 
against unions is based on the premise that they promote inefficiencies and are 
no longer affordable in today’s highly competitive global marketplace. Indeed, 
the dismantling of trade tariffs and the deregulation of industries in accordance 
with the 1993 signing of NAFTA has put unions under greater scrutiny for their 
impact on Canada’s ability to compete internationally. For example, the Canadian 
auto industry, which has one of the highest union density rates in the country, 
is in a critical state; some calling for a major restructuring of the Canadian Auto 
Workers Union’s near monopoly control. This debate is best informed by Canadian 
empirical evidence illuminating what exactly unions do to key firm outcomes, such 
as innovation.
Following Freeman and Medoff’s 1984 book, What Do Unions Do?, there has been 
a steady stream of studies examining the union effect on various measures of firm 
behaviour and performance. Some relationships have been studied more than others; 
for example the monopoly wage effect and the debated productivity effect are well 
documented (see Walsworth, 2010 for a review). Less is known about performance 
outcomes that are more difficult to quantify and thus measure, such as the ability to 
create or significantly improve a product. There are reasons to suspect that unions 
impede a firm’s ability to create new or better products, mainly by interfering with 
management’s ability to control the workplace. However there are also reasons to 
suspect that unions promote product innovation, mainly by negotiating greater 
job security and a wage premium. Additionally, higher wages and restrictions 
on outsourcing may encourage firms to compete based on innovation instead of 
competing based on low cost.
This article first reviews the limited empirical literature that examines the union 
effect on various forms of innovation. Next, the Canadian and U.S. empirical literature 
on unions and other key firm outcomes (such as productivity, labour costs, employment 
growth, sales and profitability) is reviewed to flush out union effects that may be 
relevant to understanding the impact unions have on innovation. Finally, the article 
uses Canadian private sector national data to examine the union effect on product 
innovation, a firm outcome which is widely researched in the management literature 
but has been less prominent in Industrial Relations scholarship. The data come from 
the 1999 to 2005 Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). 
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Unions and Innovation
Despite the potential role unions may have on product innovation, there is only one 
North American study that examines the direct relationship. From a cross-sectional 
sample of Canadian workplaces observed in 1999, Verma and Fang (2003) do not 
find a relationship between union measures and product innovation. This study is 
limited by the use of a single year of data, and even if a relationship was detected, 
causality would be difficult to determine. Alternatively a group of studies examines 
the effect of unions on innovation but uses a more general measure of innovation 
that also includes process innovation. From a U.S. sample Koeller (1996) finds that 
unionization is significantly lower in firms with high innovation output. Again using a 
U.S. sample, Audretsch and Schulenburg (1990) find that union density in a firm has 
a negative effect on innovation. 
In the present article, product innovation is selected as the pertinent firm outcome 
because it is closest to a final measure of firm performance. It has a more direct and 
obvious impact on actual firm success. Conceptually there are a number of reasons 
to believe that unions may restrict product innovation. This argument can be found 
in the historical trend in collective bargaining of rules in North America that clearly 
define separate worker and management responsibilities. Canadian labour law and 
policy is based primarily on the U.S. Wagner model and is premised on the assumption 
that labour and management are adversaries (e.g., Sims, Blouin and Knopf, 1995). 
According to Godard (2009: 180):
Canada has a strong normative tradition of employer hostility towards unions and of acrimonious 
union-management relations, a tradition that remains largely intact. There is also very little tradition 
of mutuality, as in the U.S., employer unilateralism on issues traditionally outside of collective 
bargaining is generally taken-for-granted, as reflected in management rights clauses and arbitral 
doctrine in the union sector. The result is a largely adversarial system, one in which unions continue 
to focus on collective bargaining and rely very little on employer ‘goodwill’. 
In a workplace environment that separates worker and management interests, 
innovation may be restricted for three reasons. First, with reduced worker/
management collaboration, it is likely that information sharing between the parties 
is limited, making product innovation less probable. Secondly, workers, as well as 
managers, are more inclined to view their goals as distinct from each other, leaving 
workers with reduced incentive to innovate. For example, if a unionized worker is 
primarily concerned with wage maximization and considers firm profits or market 
share largely the concern of management, there may be limited desire/goodwill to 
innovate. Third, unions may pursue their goals by appropriating workplace control 
from management, thus interfering with unilateral management decisions regarding 
the design, speed and process of production. In this scenario it is easy to imagine a 
management team becoming frustrated with a union that slows or even prevents the 
implementation of a policy designed to elicit specific employee behaviours, such as a 
reorganization of the shop floor to encourage collaboration. 
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons to suspect that unions promote 
product innovation. The strong preference of unions for seniority based pay, as 
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opposed to merit based pay, may encourage higher risk behaviours associated with 
innovation. In recognizing the separation between pay and productivity a worker is 
ensured of less financial consequence for pursuing innovative ideas that may detract 
from immediate job productivity. For example, a worker is more inclined to temporarily 
neglect immediate production requirements to experiment with alternative production 
materials or processes that could significantly alter the final product. Additionally, 
because union members are generally believed to enjoy a wage premium as high as 
15 to 20 percent in the U.S. (Blackburn, 2008; Hirsch, 2004) and around 7 percent in 
Canada (Verma and Fang, 2002), greater firm specific loyalty may result and workers 
may be more inclined to make contributions towards innovation. Finally, the purported 
higher cost of union labour (see Swanson and Andrews, 2007; and Black and Lynch, 
2001) and restrictions on outsourcing, via collective agreements, may encourage 
firms to compete based on product innovation, either by offering new products or 
better quality products instead of competing based on low cost.1 Conceptually, a 
union imposed higher production cost makes a low cost product strategy less viable 
for unionized firms, and thus potentially promotes alternative product competition 
strategies that rely more on product innovation.2 
Unions and (Other) Key Firm Outcomes: An Empirical 
Review
That unions detract from firm performance seems to be a sentiment beyond question. 
In a recent book about Canadian unions, Kumar and Schenk (2009: 17) observe what 
they call a ‘dominant discourse’ in the media that portrays unions in an overwhelm-
ingly negative fashion: “[T]here are frequent references in the media that unions are 
a special interest group, are ‘inflexible’, are always demanding more, cause ineffi-
ciency....” From an academic/research perspective it is interesting to consider whether 
or not unions have a negative impact on firm performance. Is there empirical evidence 
to support what has become a one sided debate against unions? 
One of the most straight forward measures of a firm success is profits. In industries 
with union and non-union workplaces it would seem that the latter would have an 
advantage. Since unions are commonly associated with greater labour costs (Hirsch, 
1992), inflexible workplace rules (Godard, 2009), a reduced ability to attract capital 
investment (Bronars, Deere and Tracy, 1994), and depressed sales levels (Voos and 
Mishel, 1986), it seems natural that non-union workplaces would report higher levels 
of profits. Alternatively it is possible that the purported advantages of unions, such as 
lower rates of employee turnover, greater job security, and higher employee morale 
may improve employee productivity so that heightened productivity in unionized 
workplaces negates the disadvantages commonly associated with unions. 
Freeman and Medoff (1984), who describe the productivity benefits of unions 
(i.e. greater voice, among others), do not claim they exceed, or even match, the 
cost of unionization, a point repeated by Freeman in a subsequent publication (see 
Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992). In fact there seems to be a consensus among studies 
from the 1980s (for example see Clark, 1984; Hirsch and Connolly, 1987; Becker and 
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Olson, 1989) and the 1990s (see Mitchell and Stone, 1992; Byrne, Dezhbakhsh and 
King, 1996; Bronars, Deere and Tracy, 1994) that not only do union productivity gains 
fail to match added cost; the net productivity effect is negative. Recent U.S. studies, 
to some degree, repeat this finding. For example, Swanson and Andrews (2007) and 
Black and Lynch (2001) find a negative productivity effect whilst Doucouliagos and 
Laroche (2003) report a small but positive union effect. Only one study in Canada 
examines the union effect on productivity. Using a small sample of 100 firms, Grant 
and Harvey (1992) find no significant difference between management’s perception 
of workplace productivity in unionized and non-unionized firms. 
Studies examining the link between union presence and firm profitability in North 
America are ambiguous. Two older U.S. studies show unionized firms experience 
substantially lower profits (Becker and Olsen, 1992; Bronars, Deere and Tracy, 1994), 
whereas a more recent U.S. study finds that union presence is associated with 
greater profitability (Batt and Welbourne, 2002), albeit the sample was restricted 
to newly created firms. Canadian evidence is limited and dated. From a sample of 
manufacturing industries Maki and Lindsay (1986) reported no union effect on profits 
from 1970 to 1979, whereas Laporta and Jenkins (1996) found that union density 
has a negative effect on firm profitability after analyzing a sample of manufacturing 
industries from 1986.
Another key firm outcome that has been examined for a union effect is a firm’s 
ability to grow in terms of the number of workers it employs. In theory, it is possible for 
unions to both increase and decrease employment growth. There are two arguments 
that suggest the possibility that unions could contribute to higher employment 
growth. First, unions present employees with ‘voice’ (Freeman and Medoff, 1984) 
that provides for a formal process to channel grievances to management without 
fear of retribution. This could increase productivity by reducing turnover, enhancing 
incentives to invest in training, improving communication flows and increasing 
employee morale. A second claim is that if unions and employers bargain over both 
wages and employment, instead of wages alone, then efficient outcomes are likely 
to lie on the demand curve (Hall and Lilien, 1979), and the effects of unions on 
employment outcomes will be ambiguous (Wooden and Hawke, 2000). 
The link between unionization and employment growth is investigated in three 
studies in North America. Studying a sample of 1,798 California manufacturing firms 
from 1974 to 1980, Leonard (1992) found that employment in unionized settings 
grew about 3.9 percent per year slower than in non-unionized settings. There have 
been no U.S. follow-up empirical studies since Leonard’s (1992) article. In Canada, 
Long (1993) analyzed a sample of 510 Canadian workplaces from the period of 1980 
to 1985, and reported that union firms grew 3.7 percent more slowly per year within 
the manufacturing industries and 3.9 percent more slowly per year within the non-
manufacturing industry. Also using Canadian data, Walsworth (2010) finds evidence 
of a diminished union employment effect in a sample covering 1999 to 2005. In fact 
Walsworth does not find any relationship between unions and employment growth 
when he employs the commonly used ‘union status’ measure, whereby even the 
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presence of a single union member triggers the firm to be coded as ‘unionized’. He 
only finds a negative union effect for firms that have a majority of their workforce 
unionized. Even after applying this stricter measure of unions, Walsworth (2010: 154) 
reports a smaller effect of −2.2 percent per annum. 
By way of review, the empirical evidence does suggest that overall unions have 
a negative impact on firm outcomes. However the evidence against unions is not 
without exceptions and, especially in the Canadian context, it is either absent or 
dated. For instance, the only relevant Canadian empirical study to be published in the 
last fourteen years finds a much diminished negative union impact (Walsworth, 2010). 
From an empirical standpoint, the effect of Canadian unions on firm performance is 
poorly documented in the Industrial Relations literature. 
Data and Measurements
The data used in this analysis were collected from the same Canadian workplaces 
in 1999, and in every year up until, and including, 2005 as part of the Employer 
Survey of the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). The advantages 
and disadvantages of the WES, and other surveys like it, are discussed by Godard 
(2001). Described in more detail in Zeytinoglu, Cooke, Harry and Chowhan (2008) 
and Cloutier, Renaud and Morin (2008), the Canadian WES aimed at shedding light 
on the relationships among competitiveness, innovation, technology use and human 
resource management.3 Until 2004, data were collected in person but by 2005 com-
puter assisted telephone interviews were used. The average response rate for the 
seven years of data collection is 74.8 percent. The initial 1999 sample was randomly 
selected from the Business Register maintained by the Business Register Division of 
Statistics Canada and is representative of all private sector workplaces with the excep-
tion of agriculture, forestry and fishing, and defence industries in the ten provinces of 
Canada. The sample was stratified for region, industry and size. The same workplaces 
were re-surveyed every year since 1999, with the most recent available data from 
2005. Of the 6,271 workplaces surveyed in 1999, the first year of data collection, 
4,250 remained in the sample in 2005. All workplaces with less than 20 employees 
were removed, further reducing the sample to 2,266 cases or 11,794 cases when the 
survey weights are applied, as they are in this research.
The Canadian WES is very similar to the British Workplace Industrial/Employee 
Relations Survey (WIRS/WERS) and the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
(AWIRS). Like these data sets the Canadian WES collects information from the same 
workplaces at various time points, providing a more accurate assessment of innovation 
activity at different points in time (unlike retrospective cross sectional data that rely on 
participant memory and record keeping). Moreover, longitudinal data better identify 
and distinguish influences that are fixed (such as industry classification) and those that 
vary over time (such as workplace performance). It should be noted that like the WIRS/
WERS and the AWIRS, the Canadian WES does not provide details on establishment 
heterogeneity (several workplaces in the sample may belong to the same firm). Also 
the workplaces in the final sample are surviving workplaces rather than representative 
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of all workplaces. By definition, the surviving workplaces do not include cases that 
have ceased to exist (potentially because of a union effect), and so the impact of 
union measures on innovation activity may be understated in the event of a negative 
relationship and overstated in the event of a positive relationship. To test the argument 
that workplaces with higher levels of unionization are more likely to disappear from the 
sample in 2005, levels of unionization in 1999 were examined in the ‘non-surviving’ 
workplaces to see if they differed significantly from the ‘surviving’ workplaces. They 
did not, so this concern is not considered to bias the subsequent results. Despite these 
limitations, a sample of private sector Canadian workplaces observed at several points 
in time offers a potentially valuable look at the union effect on product innovation. 
In the present study innovation is modelled as a dependent variable and is 
measured as a propensity to innovate, calculated as a discrete variable ranging from 
0 to 7. The minimum value of zero describes a workplace that has reported no 
product innovation activity (either improving an existing product or creating a new 
product) in any of the seven years of observation.4 The maximum value of 7 describes 
a workplace that reported either improving an existing product or creating a new 
product in each of the seven years of observation. Table 1 presents the mean value for 
the input variables used to construct the dependent variable, herein referred to as the 
‘Propensity for Product Innovation Measure’ (PPIM). In the first row of the last column, 
47.5 percent of workplaces reported product innovation activity in 1999, either as 
an improvement (42.9 percent) or as a new product (31.5 percent); meaning that 
26.9 percent of workplaces reported product innovation in both areas. The ‘Product 
Innovation Dummy’ values for all the years are summed into the PPIM and presented 
in the bottom row of the last column, reporting a value of 3.43, which is very close to 
the midpoint of the possible range of 0 to 7. Its distribution appears sufficiently close 
to normal; subsequent tests of skewness and kurtosis confirm this point. 
Table 1
Propensity to Innovate Measure: Yearly Means
Data Year Improved Product New Product Product Innovation 
 Innovation Dummy Innovation Dummy Dummy
1999 .429 .315 .475
2000 .541 .464 .597
2001 .502 .414 .565
2002 .297 .300 .389
2003 .432 .358 .474
2004 .387 .300 .438
2005 .413 .393 .489
 Improved Product New Product Innovation Propensity for Product 
 Innovation Measure Measure Innovation Measure
total (0-7) 3.01 (2.01) 2.54 (2.04) 3.43 (2.03)
source: canadian Wes, years 1999-2005. data proportions are weighted. the unweighted n is 2,266. the standard deviations for all of the 
reported yearly means fall between 0.45 and 0.50. the standard deviations for the total measures are reported in parentheses. 
What do unions do to innovation? an empirical eXamination of the canadian private sector 549
Table 2 cross-classifies measures of 1999 workplace union density levels by 
the number of reported product innovations from 1999 to 2005.5 The elements 
in this table sum horizontally to 100 percent. For comparison, the first row 
of data includes all workplaces regardless of union density level. Notice that 
in the first column of data, 8.1 percent of all workplaces report zero product 
innovations between 1999 and 2005, whereas the percentage of all workplaces 
increases steadily to 17.0 percent at 4 innovations and then declines steadily 
to 8.2 percent of all workplaces with the maximum value of innovations of 7. 
Looking at the data proportions for the workplaces segmented by five union 
density levels, there appears to be little relationship between unionization and 
product innovation. For example, 8.0 percent of workplaces with no union density 
reported zero innovations over the observation period, compared to 8.1 percent 
of all workplaces and 10.7 percent of workplaces with high union density (greater 
than 75 percent). Furthermore 50.2 percent of zero density workplaces reported 4 
or more innovations compared to 47.0 percent of high union density workplaces 
(greater than 75 percent union density). These values are very similar and suggest 
no relationship between union density and propensity to innovate; however 
there is one exception. For workplaces with low union density (> 0% to < 25%) 
there is high incidence of low innovation activity: 80 percent of workplaces in 
this category report three or less innovations, compared to 51 percent of all 
workplaces. These relationships will be further tested in subsequent multivariate 
analyses. 
Table 2
Proportional Propensity to Innovate by 1999 Workplace Union Density level
 Number of Reported Product Innovations from 1999 to 2005
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Na
all Workplaces 8.1% 13.3% 13.2% 16.4% 17.0% 14.0% 9.9% 8.2% 2,266
Union Density 
 Zero 8.0% 10.2% 13.2% 18.4% 18.7% 13.6% 10.0% 7.9% 1,227
 > 0% to < 25% 2.8% 29.9% 28.1% 19.2% 4.1% 10.0% 5.9% 0% 59
 25% to < 50% 10.0% 18.2% 11.8% 8.8% 11.2% 16.7% 12.8% 10.5% 114
 50% to < 75% 4.7% 19.0% 19.8% 12.2% 17.7% 13.0% 8.0% 5.6% 277
 > 75% 10.7% 21.9% 9.1% 11.3% 12.0% 14.5% 9.9% 10.5% 589
source: canadian Wes, years 1999-2005. data proportions are weighted. 
a  the unweighted n is reported.
A description and statistical summary of the explanatory variables are provided 
in Table 3. Note that the exclusion of all cases with missing observations resulted in 
an unweighted valid n of 1,824. In Table 3, the presence of unions in the Canadian 
private sector workplaces becomes clear: 27.9 percent of workplaces had at least 
a single union member in 1999 and approximately 84 percent of these workplaces 
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had a majority of their workers unionized.6 On average 20.5 percent of a workforce 
was covered by a union in 1999. These values reasonably coincide with Canadian 
aggregate union statistics and density rates. 
Table 3
explanatory Variables: Description and Summary Statistics
Variable Name Description Mean SD
union density  union members in 1999 as a percentage of total employment in 1999 20.5 35.2
any union status  a dummy variable for workplaces where in 1999 any union members were present .279 .448
majority union status a dummy variable for workplaces where in 1999 more than 50 percent  
 of workers were unionized .235 .424
Zero density a dummy variable for workplaces with no union density in 1999 .720 .448
> 0% to < 25% 
a dummy variable for workplaces with low union density in 1999 .016 .128
 
union density
25% to < 50% 
a dummy variable for workplaces with moderately low union density  in 1999
 
union density   .027 .163
50% to < 75%  
a dummy variable for workplaces with moderately high union density in 1999
  
union density   .069 .253
> 75% union density a dummy variable for workplaces with high union density in 1999 .165 .372
employment size  number of employees at the workplace in 1999 80.3 101.6
hrm autonomy a dummy variable indicating human resource decisions are made at this  
 workplace in 1999 .940 .236
change in hrm a variable where 1 equals more human resource autonomy, 0 equals  
autonomy the same, -1 equals less autonomy between 1999 and 2005 -.041 .334
Workplace age the age of the workplace, measured in years in 1999 18.2 20.0
sales 1 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales decreased in 1999 and in 2005 .020 .139
sales 2 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales decreased in 1999 but was stable  
 in 2005 .032 .177
sales 3 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales decreased in 1999 but increased  
 in 2005 .079 .270
sales 4 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales were stable in 1999 but decreased  
 in 2005 .049 .216
sales 5 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales were stable in 1999 and in 2005 .137 .344
sales 6 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales were stable in 1999 but increased  
 in 2005 .130 .336
sales 7 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales increased in 1999  
 but decreased in 2005 .139 .346
sales 8 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales increased in 1999 but was stable  
 in 2005 .117 .322
sales 9 a dummy variable for workplaces where sales increased in 1999 and in 2005 .294 .455
foreign ownership a dummy variable for workplaces that are majority owned by foreign interest  
 in 1999 .116 .320
international  a dummy variable for workplaces that faced product market competition  
competition from foreign companies in 1999 .495 .499
source: canadian Wes, years 1999-2005. data proportions are weighted. the unweighted valid n = 1,824. the industry classifications include: 
primary; tertiary; manufacturing; construction; transportation, warehousing, wholesale; utilities and information; retail and consumer service; 
finance, insurance, business services; real estate, rental operations; and education and health services.
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According to the Canadian WES data presented in this article, the typical workplace 
has existed for almost 19 years (as measured in 1999), employs 80 workers, has an 
11 percent chance of being majority owned by a non-Canadian interest, and has a 
50 percent chance of facing international competition. It almost always (94 percent 
of the time) has autonomy to make its own HRM policy decisions, although this 
proportion has decreased slightly from 1999 to 2005. Whereas only 2 percent of 
workplaces reported a decreasing sales level in 1999 and 2005, closer to 13 percent 
reported an increasing sales level (as opposed to decreasing or stable) in one of the 
two observation points and 29.4 percent of workplaces reported an increasing sales 
level in 1999 and 2005. These findings are not surprising given the economic growth 
experienced in Canada in the observation period. Experimentation was undertaken 
with variables not reported in Table 3. Included here are industry classifications and 
occupational mix of the workforce. The former proved to have sufficient explanatory 
power to warrant inclusion in multivariate analysis, although the descriptive statistics 
are not reported in Table 3; whereas control variables for occupational mix did not 
demonstrate any significant explanatory power, and were omitted subsequently from 
the analysis.7 
Results of the Union Effect on the Product Innovation
The OLS estimates of the propensity for product innovation are reported in Table 4. 
Specifications 1 through 5 all include the same group of control variables and re-
port homogenous effects across specifications: larger and younger workplaces are 
slightly more likely to innovate, as are workplaces with autonomy over HRM poli-
cies and, not surprisingly, workplaces that report increased levels of sales. Foreign 
ownership and exposure to international competition also increase a workplace’s 
propensity to innovate. Notice the value for the Adjusted R2 in Specification 1 is 
.186 and increases little in Specifications 2 through 5 (up to .207 in the last speci-
fication). This suggests that the union measures which are subsequently added as 
explanatory variables have relatively little predictive power, even though their coef-
ficient estimates (for the most part) are significant at the .01 level. The relatively 
minor impact of the observed union effects is further discussed in the final section 
of the article.
In Specification 2, workplace union density is entered along with the common set 
of control variables. Surprisingly, ‘Union Density’ has a positive and significant effect 
(at the p < .01 level) on a workplace’s propensity to innovate, as represented by the 
PPIM. Interpreted at the PPIM mean value of 3.43, a one unit increase in union density 
results in an increased PPIM value of 3.72 (3.43 + .294). Therefore the effect of union 
density on the PPIM (calculated at the mean) is 8.57 percent over the seven years of 
observation, or 1.22 percent a year. 
In specification 3, along with the common set of controls, the ‘Any Union Status’ 
dummy variable identifying workplaces with even a single union member replaces 
the union density measure used in the previous specification. Here again the union 
measure has a positive and significant effect on the PPIM. The presence of any level 
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Table 4
Propensity to Innovate equations (OlS): Union Status effects
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
union density   .294*** 
  (.056)
any union status   .133*** 
   (.043)
majority union status    .230*** 
    (.045)
> 0% to < 25% union density     -1.092** 
     (.123)
25% to < 50% union density     .453*** 
     (.109)
50% to < 75% union density     .284** 
     (.071)
> 75% union density     .176*** 
     (.053)
employment size .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** .002*** 
 (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
hrm autonomy 1.152* 1.182* 1.143* 1.172* 1.138* 
 (.090) (.090) (.089) (.090) (.089)
change in hrm autonomy .626*** .624*** .620*** .622*** .585*** 
 (.059) (.060) (.060) (.060) (.060)
Workplace age -.015*** -.015*** -.015*** -.015*** -.015*** 
 (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
sales 3 .874*** .851*** .851*** .863*** .856*** 
 (.128) (.128) (.128) (.128) (.127)
sales 4 -.264* -.263* -.250* -.257* -.287* 
 (.138) (.139) (.139) (.139) (.138)
sales 8 .734** .735** .734** .738** .766** 
 (.125) (.125) (.125) (.125) (.125)
sales 9 1.114*** 1.116*** 1.115*** 1.117*** 1.105*** 
 (.118) (.117) (.117) (.125) (.117)
foreign ownership .473*** 472*** .469*** .480*** .531*** 
 (.050) (.052) (.052) (.052) (.053)
international competition .620*** .624*** .622*** .629*** .633*** 
 (.035) (.037) (.037) (.037) (.037)
industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted r2 .186 .200 .199 .200 .207
model fit (f) 100.2*** 107.9*** 107.1*** 107.8*** 101.7***
unweighted n 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824
source: canadian Wes, years 1999-2005. data proportions are weighted. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10 level, the 0.05 level, and 
the 0.01 level. the constant term is included in each estimation. standard errors are reported in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
only the estimates for ‘sales’ with significance are reported. ‘Zero density’ and ‘sales 1’ (workplaces where sales decreased in 1999 and in 
2005) are reference group variables. 
What do unions do to innovation? an empirical eXamination of the canadian private sector 553
of unionization increases the PPIM score from the mean value of 3.43 to 3.56: a 
marginal effect of 3.88 percent over the observation period. In Specification 4 a 
stricter measure of union presence replaces the measure employed in the previous 
specification. The ‘Majority Union Status’ dummy variable, which identifies workplaces 
where a majority of the workers are unionized, also has a significant and positive 
effect on the PPIM, augmenting the mean value from 3.43 to 3.66: a marginal effect 
of 6.71 percent over the observation period. Considering the positive effect of union 
density reported in specification 2, it is not surprising that the stricter measure of 
unionization employed in Specification 4 is almost twice as powerful as the effect 
identified in Specification 2.8
In the final specification, union density levels are segmented into five groups. The 
dummy variable identifying workplaces with zero union density acts as the reference 
group for the remaining four union density level dummy variables. While the three 
higher union density levels are significant and positive, workplaces with more than 
zero union density but less than 25 percent, report a significant but negative effect 
on the PPIM. In other words, compared to workplaces with no union presence, a low 
level of union density restricts a workplace’s capacity to innovate, whereas higher 
levels of union density (≥ 25%) promote innovation. 
Discussion and Conclusion
Before proceeding to a discussion of the implications of the findings it is pru-
dent to clarify three methodological issues. Ideally this study would examine the 
changes in product innovation associated with changes in union status or union 
density over the observation period. The Canadian WES is collected in seven con-
secutive years which unfortunately does not leave time for sufficient changes 
in union measures. For instance over the seven year period only 3.1 percent or 
71 workplaces changed union status, and the average workplace union density 
level changed by less than 0.5 percent per year. The fixed nature of the union 
measures over the relatively short period of observation makes the data difficult 
to exploit as a panel. Secondly, to avoid collapsing the range of the dependent 
variable (where the PPIM ranges from 0 to 7) to something more manageable for 
multinomial logits (for example where 0 = no innovations; 1 = one innovation; 
2 = two or more innovations), OLS regressions are reported instead in Table 4. 
Supplementary analysis employing the more conventional multinomial logit equa-
tions yielded very similar results and is therefore not reported here; however it is 
available upon request from the author. Finally, the dependent variable (PPIM) is 
not an ideal proxy for product innovation. The measure relies on the subjective 
response of the interview participants (HR and IR managers) to assess whether or 
not an innovation was ‘significant’. Readers should be cautioned that, especially 
in large organizations, HR/IR managers may not fully understand the market/sales/
profit impact of a product innovation. It is likely that this may bias the results to 
understate or overstate the frequency of innovations in a workplace. It has two 
further weaknesses that relate to innovation being measured as a dichotomous 
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variable in the raw data. First there is no distinction between workplaces that in-
novated once in a given year or several times in the same year. Secondly there is 
no allowance for the impact of an innovation. In an attempt to add an element of 
hierarchy within unions that innovate, the PPIM is the summed result of the yearly 
dichotomous innovation variables. 
This article finds evidence that overall the presence of a union in a workplace 
does not interfere with product innovation. Although there is evidence that low 
levels of union density detract from innovation activity, on the whole union density 
measures have significant and positive estimates on product innovation. Alternative 
measures of unionization also report a positive effect on the propensity for product 
innovation. Workplaces with any union presence increased the propensity to innovate 
by 3.88 percent over the seven years of observation, and a workplace with a majority 
of their workforce unionized were 6.71 percent more likely to innovate over the same 
period. 
The positive union effect reported in the present study is a departure from 
the existing literature; Hirsch and Link (1987) estimated a negative union effect 
(albeit on the perception of innovative capabilities, not innovation itself) and 
Verma and Fang (2003), using cross sectional data, did not detect any union 
effect.9 As a caution it should be noted that these results do not necessarily imply 
that unions somehow increase a firm’s competitive advantage via a greater ability 
to innovate. It could be that the purported increased marginal production cost 
caused by unions forces management to forgo other low cost (and potentially 
more profitable) product strategies. In this sense the positive union effect on the 
PPIM observed in this study could be the result of unions making other product 
strategies, less dependent on innovation, unviable. Potentially the opportunity 
costs of unrealized profits from a low cost product strategy are more important, 
in terms of competitive advantage, than the observed positive union effect on 
product innovation. 
In light of the popular assertion that in general unions detract from firm 
performance, the findings of this study require further consideration. If unions 
unquestionably, or even on average, cause inefficiencies then the relationship 
between the various union measures and product innovation should be negative. 
The results reported in Table 4 do not show this expected negative relationship. 
In fact the statistical relationship is almost always positive. This should not be 
understood as a suggestion that unions promote innovation. For instance, the 
impact of the 3.88 marginal effect associated with union status is not clear. It 
is difficult to translate this into a measurement that clearly notes its impact on 
firm performance. From this study alone business leaders would be ill advised to 
encourage their labour force to unionize as a means of achieving superior product 
innovation. However the results are noteworthy because they do not identify a 
negative union effect on product innovation. 
Some scholars, even those sympathetic to the cause of organized labour, may not 
be concerned about the ‘negative press’ unions receive. For them, the notion that 
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unions cause inefficiency may be a foregone conclusion and an acceptable cost for 
the advantages that accompany unions, such as workplace democracy, workplace 
voice, and working class representation among others. The debate regarding the 
benefits and consequences of organized labour in Canada is best approached with 
the understanding that the empirical evidence against unions is not conclusive, as this 
study suggests.
Notes
1 In this sense greater innovation does not necessarily signal greater profits, as the firm may 
have been better pursuing a low cost strategy if it were more feasible (i.e. in the absence of 
a union). 
2   Similarly Walsworth and Verma (2007: 225) and Mitchell and Coles (2003) argue that firms 
who face low cost competition will react by intensifying their efforts to innovate so as to 
compete based on product quality and/or differentiation.
3 For data documentation on the Canadian WES refer to <http://www.statcan.ca/english/
survey/business/workplace/workplace.htm>.
4   The Canadian WES asks respondents to reply with a ‘YES’, ‘NO’, or ‘DON’T KNOW’ to 
each of the following two questions: “[In the last year], has this workplace introduced an 
improved product or service? (An improved product or service is those whose performance 
has been significantly enhanced or upgraded.)” and “[In the last year], has this workplace 
introduced a new product or service? (A new product or service differs significantly in 
character or intended use from previously produced goods or services).” The complete 
Canadian WES data dictionary is available from <http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/71-
221-XIE/intro.htm>.
5   The workplace union density measure used in this study identifies the proportion of 
unionized workers to total workers in a given workplace; not to be confused with the typical 
understanding of union density, which refers to the same measure but within a geographic 
or sectoral specification, for example Canada, or the private sector.
6   Experimentation was undertaken with a measure identifying workplaces that decertified 
(experienced a decline in union density to zero between 1999 and 2005); however, only 
3 percent or 55 cases (unweighted) were identified. Not surprisingly this variable had no 
explanatory power in the subsequent analysis and was therefore removed.
7   The industry classifications include: primary; tertiary; manufacturing; construction; 
transportation, warehousing, wholesale; utilities and information; retail and consumer 
service; finance, insurance, business services; real estate, rental operations; and education 
and health services. The descriptive properties of the ten way industry classification are in-line 
with those presented by earlier studies using the Canadian WES, for example see Walsworth 
and Verma (2007).
8   As a further check on the positive and seemingly linear relationship between the various 
measures of unionization and the PPIM, a variable squaring ‘Union Density’ was created and 
run in a supplementary specification. It proved to be positive and significant with a stronger 
effect than union density (.354***, SD = .065).
9   A related stream of literature employs Research and Development (R&D) spending as a proxy 
for innovation, and examines the union effect (for example, see Menezes-Filho, Ulph and Van 
Reenen, 1998). While these studies are well equipped to take advantage of a measurable 
indication of innovation, R&D spending is not an exact measure of actual innovation. This 
concern is especially relevant when it is modelled as dependent on unionization which likely 
affects the transition of R&D spending into actual innovation.
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SUMMARY
What Do Unions Do to Innovation? An Empirical Examination 
of the Canadian Private Sector
This article uses Canadian national data to examine the union effect on product innovation, 
a firm outcome which is widely researched in the management literature but has been 
less prominent in Industrial Relations scholarship. Using a longitudinal sample from the 
employer survey of the Canadian Workplace and Employee Survey, the union effect on 
a firm’s ability to create or improve a product is examined. According to the commonly 
held view that unions impede firm performance, the results should point to a negative 
relationship between unions and product innovation. Interestingly, a strong negative effect 
is not observed. In fact a small statistically significant positive union effect is reported. This 
result is considered to be robust. Across various specifications the presence of a union and 
the intensity of the presence (firm union density) have significant and positive effects on a 
firm’s ability to innovate new products over a seven year period (1999-2005). 
The results of this study do not imply that the presence of a union is an important 
determinant of product innovation. The results are noteworthy because they do not 
identify a negative relationship between unions and a measure of firm performance: 
product innovation. In this regard, the results give weight to the observation that 
there is very little empirical support for the popular argument that unions impede firm 
performance. 
In Canada the demise of organized labour is often justified as a necessary adjustment to 
increasingly competitive markets. Indeed the signing of the 1993 NAFTA has put unions 
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under greater scrutiny for their impact on Canada’s ability to compete internationally. 
That unions make firms less competitive is commonly accepted as a reasonable 
assessment. The results of this study and a review of the empirical literature on the 
union effect on other key firm outcomes such as productivity, labour costs, employment 
growth, sales and profitability, suggest that the popularly held negative assessment of 
unions is not based on a conclusive body of literature. 
KEYWORDS: trade unions, product innovation, Canadian national data
RéSUMé
Quel est l’effet de la présence syndicale sur les innovations en 
entreprise ? Une étude empirique du secteur privé canadien
Cet article utilise des données nationales canadiennes pour examiner l’effet des syndicats 
en matière d’innovation en matière de produits dans les entreprises, sujet abondamment 
traité dans la littérature managériale mais moins présent dans les travaux empiriques 
en relations industrielles. À partir d’un échantillon longitudinal de la composante 
« employeur » de l’Enquête sur le milieu de travail et les employés (EMTE) de Statistique 
Canada, l’effet de la présence syndicale sur la capacité de l’entreprise à créer de nouveaux 
produits ou à améliorer ses produits déjà existants est étudié. Selon un point de vue 
communément admis à l’effet que les syndicats agiraient plutôt comme un frein sur 
la performance de l’entreprise, les résultats de l’étude devraient indiquer une relation 
négative entre la présence syndicale et l’innovation en matière de produit. Or l’étude ne 
révèle aucun lien négatif fort. Au mieux seul un faible lien positif est observable d’un point 
de vue statistique. Et ce résultat est considéré comme robuste. En poussant les analyses 
selon diverses spécifications de la variable syndicale (mesurée selon la densité syndicale ou 
la présence syndicale), celle-ci est associée à des effets forts et positifs sur la capacité de 
l’entreprise à innover avec de nouveaux produits sur une période de sept ans (1999-2005).
Les résultats de l’étude n’impliquent pas que la présence d’un syndicat est un important 
déterminant en matière d’innovation de produit. Mais ils méritent d’être retenus 
parce qu’ils ne soutiennent pas l’existence d’une relation négative entre syndicats 
et performance de l’entreprise en matière d’innovation de produits. À cet égard les 
résultats donnent du poids à l’observation qu’il existe très peu de soutien empirique à 
l’argument populaire que les syndicats sont un frein à la performance des entreprises.
Au Canada l’opposition au syndicalisme est souvent justifiée comme un ajustement 
nécessaire des entreprises à des marchés de plus en plus compétitifs. À cet égard la 
signature de l’Accord de libre-échange nord-américain de 1993 (ALENA) a mis davantage 
de pression sur les syndicats dont on étudie de plus près l’impact sur la capacité du Canada 
à concurrencer sur le plan international. Affirmer que les syndicats rendent les entreprises 
moins concurrentielles est communément accepté comme une évaluation raisonnable. Les 
résultats de la présente étude et la revue de la littérature empirique sur l’effet des syndicats 
sur d’autres extrants clé de l’entreprise comme la productivité, les coûts du travail, la 
croissance de l’emploi, les ventes et la profitabilité, suggèrent que la perception populaire 
négative à l’égard des syndicats ne repose pas sur un corps de littérature concluant.
MOTS CLÉS : syndicats, innovation en matière de production, données nationales 
canadiennes
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RESUMEn
¿Qué hacen los sindicatos por la innovación? Un análisis 
empírico del Sector privado canadiense
Este artículo usa datos nacionales canadienses para analizar el impacto sindical 
sobre la innovación del producto, un resultado empresarial que es ampliamente 
investigado en los estudios científicos de gestión pero que ha sido menos destacado 
en las investigaciones en relaciones industriales. Se utiliza una muestra longitudinal de 
empleadores proveniente de la Encuesta Canadiense del medio laboral y del empleado 
para examinar el efecto sindical en la capacidad de una empresa para crear o mejorar 
un producto. Según el punto de vista muy generalizado que los sindicatos impiden el 
rendimiento empresarial, los resultados deberían indicar una relación negativa entre 
sindicatos e innovación del producto. Sorprendentemente, no se observa un fuerte 
efecto negativo. En realidad, se observa un ligero efecto positivo estadísticamente 
significativo. Este resultado es considerado consistente. A través varias especificaciones, 
la presencia de un sindicato y la intensidad de su presencia (densidad sindical de la 
empresa) tienen efectos significativos y positivos en la capacidad de la empresa para 
innovar productos, y esto dentro de un periodo de siete anos (1999-2005).
Los resultados de este estudio no implican que la presencia de un sindicato sea 
un determinante importante de la innovación de productos. Los resultados son 
remarcables porque no identifican una relación negativa entre sindicatos y una medida 
de rendimiento empresarial: la innovación de productos. En este sentido, los resultados 
respaldan la observación que hay muy poca sustentación empírica al argumento popular 
que los sindicatos impiden el rendimiento empresarial.
En Canadá, la desaparición de la organización laboral es frecuentemente justificada 
como un ajustamiento necesario a la competitividad creciente de los mercados. Es más, 
la firma del TLCAN en 1993 puso los sindicatos bajo un mayor escrutinio en cuanto a su 
impacto sobre la capacidad de competición internacional de Canadá. Que los sindicatos 
hacen que las firmas sean menos competitivas es generalmente aceptado como 
una apreciación lógica. Los resultados de este estudio y una revisión de la literatura 
empírica sobre el impacto sindical sobre otros resultados claves de la empresa como la 
productividad, los costos laborales, el crecimiento del empleo, las ventas y las ganancias, 
sugieren que la apreciación popular ampliamente negativa de los sindicatos no está 
basada en un contenido concluyente de estudios científicos.
PALABRAS CLAVES: sindicatos, innovación de productos, datos nacionales Canadienses
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